Planning, Time, and Rationality

Intentions seem subject to basic rationality norms, including norms of consistency, means-end coherence, and (perhaps) stability over time. Such norms seem central to the planning agency in which intentions are normally embedded. But what is the nature and status of such norms? Why are they if indeed they are norms of rationality? What is the big deal about such consistency, coherence, stability? Is appeal to such norms an unjustified myth? What is the relation between such norms and theoretical norms of consistency, coherence, and (perhaps) stability of belief? Are there defensible norms not only of rationality at a time but also of rationality over time? What is the relation between such norms and agency? What is the relation between such norms and self-governance at a time/self-governance over time? Readings from Bratman, Broome, Brunero, Ferrero, Gold, Holton, Kolodny, Korsgaard, Millgram, Nefsky, Paul, Raffman, Raz, Tenenbaum, Setiya, Velleman, Wallace. Repeatable for credit. Prerequisite: graduate standing in Philosophy or permission of instructor. 2 unit option only for Philosophy PhD students beyond the second year; all others must enroll for 4 units.