Matching and Market Design

This is an introduction to market design, intended mainly for second year PhD students in economics (but also open to other graduate students from around the university and to undergrads who have taken undergrad market design). It will emphasize the combined use of economic theory, experiments, and empirical analysis to analyze and engineer market rules and institutions. In this first quarter we will pay particular attention to matching markets, which are those in which price doesn't do all of the work, and which include some kind of application or selection process. We will also cover some of the basics of auction theory, with a particular emphasis on its connections to matching. In recent years market designers have participated in the design and implementation of a number of marketplaces, and the course will emphasize the relation between theory and practice, for example in the design of labor market clearinghouses for American doctors, school choice programs in a growing number of American cities (including New York and Boston), the allocation of organs for transplantation, online advertising auctions, and the market for transportation. Various forms of market failure will also be discussed. Assignment: One final paper. The objective of the final paper is to study an existing market or an environment with a potential role for a market, describe the relevant market design questions, and evaluate how the current market design works and/or propose improvements on the current design.